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After a brief overview of Ayn Rand’s 
own career and character, the authors devote 
one large section to the attributes of ‘effective 
people’ in business and industry, and another 
section to business organisation, focusing on 
entrepreneurship, innovation, vision and long-
range thinking. True to their own commitment 
to economy and rational organisation, the 
authors divide each chapter into titled 
subheadings. For example, the chapter on 
‘Justice’ – which examines, among other 
things, the justice of T. J. Rodgers, CEO and 
founder of Cypress Semiconductor – contains 
such subheadings as ‘Justice Defined,’ ‘Loyalty 
to the Facts’ and ‘Moral Judgment and 
Response.’ Doubtless, in a new edition of 
 
Ayn 
Rand and Business
 
, that chapter may contain 
the additional subheading, ‘You Can’t Cheat 
Reality,’ comparing the Enron débâcle with its 
parallels in the fraud and bankruptcy of the 
Twentieth Century Motor Company in 
 
Atlas 
Shrugged
 
 and of the Monadnock Valley episode 
in 
 
The Fountainhead
 
.
The authors, who are seasoned and 
knowledgeable business journalists and 
publishers, deftly and with obvious agreement 
with Rand explicate each Objectivist virtue with 
numerous anecdotes and instances from the 
real world. They cite the words and actions of 
the men behind Polaroid, Nucor Steel, 
General Electric, Microsoft, Intel and other 
companies, linking them with the actions of 
characters from Rand’s three major novels, 
 
We the Living
 
, 
 
The Fountainhead
 
 and 
 
Atlas 
Shrugged
 
. Their stated purpose is to prove to
the business reader that little or no conflict 
exists between fiction and real life; the virtues 
which move her heroes and heroines are as 
practical and efficacious in the real world as 
they are in her fiction, while the vices which 
move her villains are no less disastrous and 
contemptible in real life than they are in 
her novels.
Hopefully, in the future, this book will 
become a dog-eared standard title on 
everyone’s business bookshelf. Greiner and 
Kinni advise that if the business reader takes 
 
Ayn Rand and Business
 
 seriously, ‘you will know 
why Ayn Rand is important in today’s world 
and why she will continue to be influential in 
the future . . . You will certainly understand 
why Ayn Rand matters.’
 
Edward Cline
 
Author of the 
 
Sparrowhawk
 
 series of historical 
novels, Yorktown, Virginia
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Economics and ethics are and long have been 
interrelated disciplines. Both deal with normative 
and empirical questions and, for an undertaking 
in one of these fields to be successful, or so the 
author of this book argues, it must be 
accompanied by a knowledge of the relevant 
aspects and findings of the other field. With the 
publication of this book, Leland B. Yeager, a 
noted economist, participates in a long 
tradition of ethical inquiry from an economic 
perspective, a tradition which includes Hume, 
Smith, Bentham, Mill, Keynes, Hayek and 
others, upon whose works Yeager frequently, 
extensively and openly draws. The book’s title 
accurately conveys its nominally central point: 
that ethics should rely heavily on the findings of 
the social sciences. However, the bulk of the 
book consists of a case for utilitarianism, which 
Yeager judges to be essential to the approach to 
ethics that he advocates. While far from 
groundbreaking, this work is on the whole well 
thought-out and worthy of attention.
Much of the beginning of the book seems 
to come almost verbatim from an article of 
Yeager’s in the March 1996 issue of the 
 
Atlantic 
Economic Journal
 
. In the first chapter the case is 
made that economics has a relevant place in 
ethical dialogues. Obviously, economists deal 
with matters of public and business policy, and 
thus can offer the positive data needed for the 
formulation of such policy. Moreover, the 
study of economics engenders an awareness of 
the difference between short-run and long-run 
interests, which, when one uses a utilitarian 
ethic, is quite important to consider. Economists 
tend to have a good understanding of human 
nature and behaviour, which is necessary for 
ethical investigations. Clergymen, whose 
expertise is grounded almost exclusively in 
faith, have a less pertinent presence in moral 
and ethical discussions than do social scientists.
Of course, this conclusion depends on the 
utilitarian ethic to the defence of which Yeager 
devotes most of the remainder of the book. The 
general happiness, best pursued through social 
co-operation, should be the goal of ethical 
injunctions and mandates. He favours a rules 
or indirect utilitarianism, as opposed to act 
utilitarianism. This stripe of utilitarianism 
encourages socially useful or benign behaviour 
through the implementation of general rules 
and the cultivation of attitudes and character 
traits, while act utilitarianism, theoretically, 
calls for an appraisal (with regard to the general 
happiness) of the anticipated outcome of each 
human action prior to taking action. Needless 
to say, this latter approach would prove to be 
unwieldy at best and probably impossible, 
while the former, Yeager contends, is a viable 
method for determining policy.
Yeager moves on to address criticisms 
that are generally aimed at utilitarianism, 
addressing the issue of aggregation, the charge 
that indirect utilitarianism leads to a variety of 
immoralities and an over-emphasis on rules, as 
well as the allegation that such a philosophy is 
vacuous. He counters the Kantian duty-based 
ethics with a nominally utilitarian ethic of 
universalisability. He derives a justification 
for government, law and regulation from his 
indirect utilitarianism, addressing rival 
doctrines, and devoting an appendix to an 
attempt at refuting libertarianism and classical 
liberalism; in order for any society to function, 
the government must have the authority to 
use initiatory force, he argues. The last 
chapter is a summary of the rest of the book.
Yeager writes clearly and persuasively, 
making his train of thought easy to follow 
and is always honest about potentially weak 
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points in the arguments presented. The book 
is well-researched, and draws on many 
other works so that anyone unfamiliar with 
the ideas being discussed is still able to 
follow the author’s arguments; in fact, 
this book is good reading for anyone without 
a broad knowledge of the writers discussed.
 
P. Brickey LeQuire 
 
Samford University, Birmingham, AL
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Economists generally assume, explicitly 
or implicitly, that individuals are utility 
maximisers. Not, notice, that they always 
succeed in maximising utility, but rather that 
they consistently try to make themselves and 
their families as well off as they can, given their 
tastes, their abilities, the costs of gaining 
information and of transacting, and so on. That 
kind of behaviour is taken to be a deep-seated 
human characteristic, and presumably therefore 
holds for all times and all places unless the 
assumption is for some reason explicitly 
abandoned. Accordingly, then, applied 
economists should be great users of historical 
data. Not only would they get an abundance of 
data, but the past could be a laboratory in which 
to examine the effects of various laws, 
regulations and institutions on the behaviour of 
the economy in all its aspects. Surprisingly – 
astonishingly – very few economists pay much 
heed to history, often dismissing results 
derived from it as being based on ‘old data’. 
(Occasionally one even encounters the phrase 
‘data from the past’ – I look forward with 
interest to seeing data from the future.)
Charles Calomiris is one of the 
comparatively few economists who does not 
neglect data from far in the past. He uses data 
not only to understand the past, but to 
illuminate the present and to give policy advice 
which would improve future conditions. This 
book shows just how wise he is to pursue 
that approach, and how much others who 
neglect it are missing. He examines US 
banking history and the history of US 
banking regulation, and arrives at fascinating 
conclusions which should be of interest 
to anyone concerned with present-day 
banking and its regulation.
This book could in fact serve as a text, not 
comprehensive but certainly wide in its coverage, 
on US banking history, on bank regulation, and 
on the political economy of regulation. I shall 
touch on all these three aspects.
There are six chapters in the book. In the 
first, banking instability is defined, and the 
existence of it traced primarily to the structure 
of the banking industry. Instability, he notes, is 
a twofold concept. It can mean a ‘propensity for 
panics’ or a ‘propensity for insolvency’ (p. 3). 
‘Panics involve contractions of bank deposits 
and lending by all banks’. Failure, by contrast, 
involves receivership or insolvency of 
individual banks. There have been panics with 
few failures; and failures have occurred without 
leading to panics.
The key structural aspect which makes 
banking systems unstable is the absence of 
branch banking. Calomiris traces the persistent 
failure of branching to develop in the US (in 
contrast to, for example, the UK) to regulation. 
One could well ask at this point why regulation, 
surely designed to protect the customer and 
thus to bring stability to the banking industry, 
did the opposite. This question is answered. 
But before that, what are the other topics 
in the book?
Chapter 2 examines what causes banking 
panics. (Causes not in the sense of making the 
system prone to panics, but rather in the sense 
of what triggers them in a given system.) The 
authors of the chapter (it is co-authored with 
Gary Gorton) contrast two theories – random 
withdrawal and ‘asymmetric information’. The 
first results from sudden demands for cash, the 
second from an increased belief that because of 
the state of the economy banks have become 
more likely to fail. The balance of evidence 
seems to tilt towards believing the first, but 
the chapter concludes with some suggestions 
for further exploration of the second. This is 
worth noting, for it highlights the scrupulous 
care with which the data are tested and the 
results summarised; the book also teaches 
by example.
There are then chapters on the origin of 
federal deposit insurance (which, having had 
many advocates for over 40 years, was enacted 
after the Great Crash and the bank failures 
which, quite coincidentally, followed it); the 
losses the US has suffered as a result of not 
having ‘universal banks’ but insisting on 
separating commercial and investment 
banking; how the fall in the costs of issuing 
shares over time is the result not of regulator-
enforced competition but rather of falls in 
marketing costs; and, in the final chapter, an 
examination of the fairly rapid emergence, as a 
result of both long-run competitive pressures 
and short-run performance problems, of 
universal banking in the US.
The book thus covers a good number of 
aspects of US banking, and the interaction with 
it of US banking regulation. It shows, as the 
above summary outlines, how banking evolution 
and regulatory evolution have gone on together 
in a process of continual interaction.
What has not yet been discussed in this 
review is why regulation can often be harmful to 
what it claims to help, the ‘public interest’. That 
theme is implicitly addressed in every chapter, 
and there is explicit discussion of it in the book’s 
fascinating introduction. The central argument 
is that regulation is often the result of lobbying 
by ‘concentrated minorities’. That is why 
banking regulation – the protection of failure-
prone unit banks, for example – often assisted 
particular narrow interest groups rather than 
the general public. There is also a revealing 
discussion of the current competition for 
regulatory territory between various regulatory 
agencies in the USA. Calomiris shows how 
‘inertia’ serves to raise rewards to lobbying, by 
making it hard to organise the groups necessary 
to undo legislated harm. (At this point 
Calomiris quotes Thomas Jefferson to help 
make his point; the range of references in this 
book is wide!)
